Menzies Campbell is right to say "there are no easy options for the future of British defence policy – but there is no choice but change", in the Guardian today, and he makes some interesting and pertinent observations of current defence policy. However, for a politician, he is a little too reluctant to suggest in which direction that change should head; we can all highlight weaknesses, but politicians need to be a bit bolder when it comes to proposals.
There is, indeed, an incoherence in a defence policy that, on the one hand, knowingly underfunds key areas like housing, injury compensation and manning levels (units routinely break the 24 month harmony guidelines between operational tours) whilst, on the other, presiding over a defence budget that will never allow significant improvement in these areas. The conclusion from this is clear: we must either reduce commitments and capability or increase spending. I have mentioned before how strange is our willingness to underwrite £100 billion for Northern Rock whilst not finding an extra £5-10 billion for defence. After all, no-one died over Northern Rock, did they?
We should, also, be well past the understanding that "fighting on two fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan is unsustainable and threatens to break the back of the army". We know this because of what we hear in the Select Committee on Defence about planning assumptions: "In December 2003 the Revised Scales of Effort required the capability to mount, without overstretch, one medium and two small operations (the medium and one small being peace support operations, the other small being an intervention operation) but with the ability also to reconfigure rapidly to two medium and one small (where one of the mediums is an intervention operation)."
With Afghanistan and Iraq, we are firmly in the two medium and one small if you include other commitments in Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Falklands and more. Although we are pulling back in Iraq, there are still (May 2008) 4,000 troops in theatre. If anyone is unsure, this is still at least a brigade deployment. With only 8 operational brigades, including 3 Cdo Bde, I fail to see how we can sustain even 2 brigade deployments and remain within harmony guidelines. The implication is clear: we are over committed and our planning assumptions are not matched by defence capability. With 6 month tours and a need to have 24 months away from operations between tours, we clearly require 10 brigades, not 8. And this does not take into account the small scale operation.
In this, Menzies Campbell is surely right to notice that "it is the nation's most valuable defence asset – the men and women of the armed forces – who bear the brunt of these failures" and it is "strategy" that needs to be sorted out. All this is true but we are where we are, as they say.
On present structuring, we can maintain one brigade and one small scale operation or a single short term large scale deployment for about 6 months, and that is all. Therefore, until the Armed Forces gets bigger, we should never, ever have agreed to increase commitment in Afghanistan whilst we were still in Iraq. that we did, is symptomatic of the weakness of our political masters who cannot bear to be seen weak in refusing to "punch above our weight"; surely one of the most conceited political slogan of recent times.
The four options he highlights are all, indeed, pertinent:
- Carry on as we are. He is right to rule this out. Our current attitude and posture is unsustainable and has been since SDR first came into effect.
- Increase defence spending to bring capability in line with SDR assumptions. This option is indeed valid and if our politicians want to keep us committed, and we have to assume that they do, we must have more money spent on defence, especially on increasing the number of formations and procuring more and better equipment (vehicles and helicopters). "Is the British tax payer ready to pay that much more?", he asks. Well, they have not kicked up too much of a fuss over Northern Rock so why not and who seriously doubts that some efficiencies and spending reductions cannot be made elsewhere?
- Stop liberal interventionism. This is the other viable option but one that is not going to happen. We are committed to NATO and NATO has decided it wants to do liberal interventionism. I see no politician that has the courage to stand up and advocate a change to NATO policy. They should, but they will not (at least in the near future). There is, also, uncertainty as to what liberal interventionism means. Did Iraq and Afghanistan fall under this description? I don't think they ever did but whilst politicians want to intervene in far away lands then it is necessary to equip the Armed Forces properly.
- Reconfigure the Armed Forces to fight the wars of today. This is as ill advised as option 1. He makes a valid point that attack submarines, aircraft carriers and combat aircraft add little to military effectiveness in Afghanistan, but is he forgetting the grand standing of Miliband and Cameron over Russia and Georgia? The only operation we should be scaled for is warfighting; all else cascades from this posture. We need kinetic energy to defeat the most potent threats and it is easier to scale down than up. Anyone who argues otherwise is either an idiot or someone who has no understanding of war. The whole point of a deterrent is that it deters by demonstrating a capability and willingness, albeit reluctant, to fight the worst kind of war You would not want to be caught out without an "insurance policy" on your home so why suggest that we don't need it for our country?
Politicians, Menzies Campbell included, have to get serious about defence. It is not a Westminster game but a serious business of life and death. And it is the best this country has to offer that are doing the dyeing. If they must commit troops, then they have a moral and political duty to see that they are best equipped for the job.
So Menzies, you have written a thoughtful and perceptive article but what we want to hear is not an outline of the issues but your proposal for a way forward. That is what you are in Parliament for.